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I.

INTRODUCTION

In everyday practice, a physician has the difficult task of correct
diagnosis and treatment of communicable diseases.' When a patient
presents with communicable disease symptoms, the physician's immediate action is to attend to that individual's needs. However, the

1. A communicable disease is a disease "the causative agents of which may pass or be carried
from one person to another directly or indirectly." BENJAMIN F. MILLER, M.D. & CLAIR BRAcKMAN
KEANE, R.N., B.S., ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND NURSING 281 (1972); See generally ABRAM S. BENENSON, CONTROL OF COMuNICABLE DISEASES IN MAN (15th ed. 1990) (descriptions
of approximately two hundred communicable diseases).

1031
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physician must also consider the extent to which the communicable
disease may spread and who may be subsequently affected.
This article focuses on when physician liability for malpractice
to a patient will be extended to third person non-patients who have
contracted a communicable disease from the physician's patient. A
dearth of case law exists and decisions turn on the specific facts
involved. Therefore, this article will combine chronological, factual,
and theoretical analysis to plot judicial response to non-patient party
2
claims.
Most importantly, this article attempts to provide physicians and
lawyers who advise physicians with a basis on which to determine
appropriate practice policies. By anticipating situations of potential
extended liability, physicians may to some extent limit liability while
providing quality patient care.
Section II provides a background of tort principles applicable to
medical malpractice actions. Next, Section III presents some of the
limited case law of non-patient actions against physicians. Section
IV specifically addresses non-patient claims against physicians for
communicable disease infection by the physician's patient. Section
V will examine a recent Pennsylvania decision3 appearing to expand
physician liability in this area, followed by analysis of subsequent
comments by the lower court that may qualify the holding. Section
VI will then turn to the effect of reporting statutes in communicable
disease cases and current legislation in West Virginia.
The West Virginia courts to date have not been faced with a
communicable disease case and little direction is available in case
law to predict how courts will respond. Discussion in Section VII
2. Communicable disease cases have been examined in this manner most frequently with regard
to duty to warn possible AIDS contacts and confidentiality. See generally Harold L. Hirsh, A Visitation
With Aids, 37 MED. TRIAL TE C. Q. 1 (1990); Holly A. Rosencranz & Warren G. Lavey, Treating

Patients With CommunicableDiseases:Limiting Liability For Physiciansand Safeguarding the Public
Health, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 75 (1987); Frederick R. Fahrner, Comment, The Physician'sDuty to
Warn Non-Patients:AIDS Enters the Equation, 5 CooLEY L. REv. 353 (1988); Joseph D. Piorkowski,
Jr., Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the Conflicting Physician'sDuties of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding Confidentiality, 76 GEO. L.J. 169 (1987); Siobhan
Spillane, Note, AIDS: Establishing a Physician'sDuty to Warn, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 645 (1990).

3. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990).
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encourages a moderate approach in extension of physician liability
to prevent adoption of a broad rule that may require future modification.
II.

BASIC TORT PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Traditional tort law requires four elements to sustain a cause of

action in negligence: 1) a duty recognized by the law requiring a
person to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; 2) a breach of that duty;
3) a reasonably close causal connection between the resulting injury
and the conduct; and 4) resulting injury or damage. 4 These elements
apply to the hybrid negligence action of medical malpractice, with5
the determination of the physician's duty always a question of law.
If the court finds that a duty exists, the jury may then determine
whether the doctor has acted with the level of learning and skill
6
commonly possessed by members of the profession in good standing,
and if the doctor's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.
Medical malpractice cases appear to be unique because the plaintiff must present expert testimony concerning causation in order to
establish a prima facie case. 7 Also, a physician-patient relationship
provides the foundation on which to base a malpractice action.8 No
West Virginia case has held a physician liable to another without
a sufficient physician-patient relationship.9

4. WFLLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971); see

also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
5. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 53, at 324.
6. Id. § 32, at 162. See also W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-3 (Supp. 1992). The plaintiff must prove
that "[t]he health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning required or
expected of a reasonable, prudent health provider in the profession or class to which the health care
provider belongs acting in the same or similar circumstances."
7. Michael J. Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
251, 251 (1979). See also Hinkle v. Martin, 256 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1979) (res ipsa loquitur does
not apply to medical malpractice).
8. Rand v. Miller, 408 S.E.2d 655, 656 (W. Va. 1991); See also Weaver v. Union Carbide
Corporation, 378 S.E.2d 105 (W. Va. 1989) (lack of professional relationship forecloses malpractice
claim).
9. Michael J. Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
251, 255 (1979); See Rand v. Miller, 408 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1991).
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Generally, a duty to protect another does not exist merely by
one's realization that action on his or her part is necessary to protect
the other.' 0 However, an exception to this rule occurs when a special
relationship exists between the parties." Some courts have recently
used special relationships to bypass the need for a physician-patient
relationship in communicable disease malpractice actions brought by
non-patients.
An additional tort theory that allows extension of liability is
applicable when a person has undertaken to perform services to
another, either gratuitously or for consideration, that he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third party. 2 Liability
may be found if the third party suffers harm as a result of reliance
on the undertaking. 3 Courts have previously applied this theory in
communicable disease cases, but the recent decision of DiMarco v.
4
Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc. has brought it to the fore.'
III.

EXTENSION OF PHYSICIAN LIABILITY IN SITUATIONS OTHER
THNT COmmuNcABLE DISEASES

Generally, courts have continued to require the direct physicianpatient relationship before allowing malpractice action against a doctor. For example, in Peace v. Weisman,' 5 a Georgia court sustained
the summary judgment for the physician in a wife's malpractice
action to recover for the death of her husband. In a disability determination examination for the Georgia Department of Human Resources, the physician did not reveal abnormal chest x-ray results
directly to the patient.'6 The doctor reported the abnormalities only
to the state.17 The patient subsequently died of lung cancer.' 8 The

10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) reads: "The fact that the actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself
impose upon him a duty to take such action."
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
13. Id.
14. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990).
15. 368 S.E.2d 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
16. Id. at 320.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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court held that under a malpractice claim, privity "continues to be
an essential ingredient" and therefore, the wife's claim was barred. 19
However, courts have used two legal theories in allowing malpractice actions against physicians by third person non-patients outside of a direct physician-patient relationship, including foreseeability
20
of injury and special relationships.
Foreseeability of injury is frequently used by courts in determining physician duty in cases concerning operation of motor vehicles by patiefits under treatment. In 1983, the Texas court in

Gooden v. Tips2' addressed the issue of a physician's duty in prescribing consciousness altering medications. The court granted a cause
of action against the doctor when he failed to warn his patient not
to drive while under the influence of Quaalude, the prescribed tran-

quilizer.2 2 The court found that the physician could foresee possible
injury to the driving public and a duty arose to use reasonable steps
under the circumstances (here, a warning not to drive)23 to reduce
the likelihood of injury to others.2 4 However, the court stopped short
of requiring the doctor to control the patient's behavior. 25 In cases
involving prescription drugs, the physician has special knowledge of
26
the effects of the medication which are not known to the patient.
The physician, therefore, must instruct the patient regarding reasonable precautions to be taken.27
19. Id. at 321.
20. See Frederick R. Fahrner, Comment, The Physician'sDuty To Warn Non-Patients: AIDS
Enters the Equation, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 353 (1988).
21. 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); See also Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984) (doctor's failure to diagnose or properly treat epilepsy may foreseeably create risk
of harm to third party).
22. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 370.
23. Id.
24. See Kaiser v. Suburban Transportation System, 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1965) (cause of action
against doctor who did not warn bus driver patient of drowsiness associated with medication for nasal
condition who then had accident resulting in plaintiff's injury).
25. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 370.
26. Timothy H. Norton, Joy v. Eastern Maine Medical Center:Extension of a Physician'sDuty
to Third Parties, 40 MAINE L. REV. 207, 215 (1988).
27. See, e.g., Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973) (physician negligently advised
patient with undiagnosed seizure disorder that he could drive an automobile). But see Davis v. Mangelsdorf, 673 P.2d 951 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (dismissed for failure to state a cause of action against
physician for advise to epileptic patient to discontinue anticonvulsant 17 years before auto accident
injuring plaintiff).
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In a related situation, a California court, in Myers v. Quesenberry,28 allowed a cause of action against the physicians by an injured pedestrian who was struck by a car driven by a female patient
whom the doctors had directed to go immediately to a nearby hospital. The diabetic patient was emotionally distraught after learning
from the doctors that she was carrying a dead fetus and required
surgical abortion. 29 The court reasoned that, as a practical matter,
the doctors could not have warned the plaintiff. However, warning
the impaired patient not to drive would have fulfilled their duty to
third persons foreseeably injured. 0 The court recognized a duty to
take "reasonable [steps] under the circumstances to protect ... foreseeable victims ... of [the patient's] dangerous conduct." 3 To prevail, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence of the inadequate
warning, or lack of any warning, given to the patient.3 2
Generally, however, when a doctor gives adequate warning to a
patient, a duty to an injured third person is not established. In
Cartierv. Long Island College Hospital,"a the New York court held
the doctor had no duty to the injured plaintiff when an intoxicated
alcoholic, treated as an outpatient, lost control of his car and struck
the plaintiff. The court believed common knowledge dictated not
operating a vehicle while intoxicated.3 4 Moreover, the doctor warned
the alcoholic not to drive.35 Therefore, when a doctor adequately
warns a patient not to engage in potentially dangerous activity, the
doctor will most likely not be held liable for injury to a third person.
Within the concept of foreseeability of harm, courts have found
special relationships outside the physician-patient relationship sufficient to support a cause of action such as in the Michigan decision

28. 144 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
29. Id. at 734.
30. Id. at 735.
31. Id. at 736.
32. See Joy v. Marston, 581 A.2d 418 (Me. 1990) (plaintiff injured in vehicular accident allowed
cause of action against patient's treating physician but did not prevail because of inconsistent evidence
of warning not to drive).
33. 490 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
34. Id. at 604.

35. Id.
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of Welke v. Kuzilla.36 The plaintiff's wife was killed when the patient, who was driving the doctor's car and had been injected with
an unknown substance by the doctor, collided with the deceased. 37
Conversely, recently in Klein v. Morgen,31 a federal district court
sitting in Colorado did not find a- special relationship sufficient for
a wife and child to recoyer under a medical malpractice theory, when
a physician did not timely complete the physician statement required
for the husband's application for disability and life insurance. 39 Additionally, the court found no evidence that the physician knew that
the wife and child were named beneficiaries-thereby precluding a
finding of duty. 40
In summary, courts addressing extension of physician liability
outside the traditional physician-patient relationship have relied on
decisions such as these and communicable disease cases. The use of
foreseeability of injury and special relationships provides a fragile
framework on which courts hang the specific facts of the case.
Generally, if a physician provides a patient circumstantially reasonable advice regarding dangerous activities or when injury to a
non-patient is strictly economic, the physician's liability will most
likely not be extended to non-patients. Special relationships sufficient to extend liability will be fact specific and, therefore, difficult
to predict.
IV.

Ti

EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CASES

Courts have recognized actionable negligence in the direct spread
of contagious disease between a contagious patient and another. For
example, the New Jersey Superior Court in Earle v. Kuklo 4' allowed
a cause of action against a landlord for renting an upstairs apartment
to a family without informing them that the landlord and her family

36. 375 N.W.2d 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); See also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (psychotherapist has a limited duty to warn only readily identifiable victims of specific threats of violence from a patient in a therapeutic relationship).
37. Welke, 375 N.W.2d at 404.
38. 760 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Colo. 1991).
39. Id. at 1409.
40. Id.
41. 98 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953).
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were infected with tuberculosis.42 A later born child contracted the
disease by coming in close contact with the landlord. 43 The court
held that anyone who negligently exposes another to his or her communicable disease may be liable for damages, if the other subsequently contracts the disease. 4 Additionally, courts have used various
intentional tort theories in recognizing a cause of action in situations
involving sexually transmitted diseases between partners. 5
A limited number of cases have been decided concerning a physician's duty to non-patients in the context of communicable diseases. Depending on the factual situation, a physician treating a
patient for a communicable disease may be under a duty to diagnose
the disease and to relay the information to those at risk. The 1899
New Hampshdre decision of Edwards v. Lamb 46 constitutes the earliest communicable disease case to allow a negligence action against
a physician outside a physician-patient relationship. The physician
assured the patient's wife there would be no danger in attending to
her husband's seeping wounds.47 The wife, having "'pricks on her
fingers" ,48 became infected with septic poisoning. 49 The court found
a duty upon the doctor, even though unaware of the breaks in the
wife's skin, to prevent the spread of the disease.50 Thus, the court
held the doctor liable because his affirmative action of assurance
opened the wife to contamination."'
The next case to consider a physician's duty to protect nonpatients from communicable disease came twenty years later, when
the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Skillings v. Allen,52 in which

42. Id. at 108.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 109.

45. Robert Craig Waters, Liability Under FloridaLaw for Exposing Others to Infectious Disease, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1990, at 36. In addition to negligence, some cases have used intentional tort
theories such as assault or battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in bringing
a cause of action for transmission of disease. Id.
46. 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899).

47. Id. at 480.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 481.
Id.
Id.
Id.
173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919).
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the court held that the patient's parents could bring a cause of action 53
after contracting scarlet fever. The parents had relied on the advice
of the physician that they would be at no risk in visiting their daughter in the hospital or in taking her home. 4 The court stated that
one becomes responsible for the direct consequences of one's acts
when it is obvious that injury will be caused by lack of one's due
care. 5 Reporting the case of scarlet fever to the state board of health
did not fulfill the physician's total duty.5 6 Furthermore, since parents
are naturally in closer contact with a child than anyone else, there
exists a duty to protect parents by advising them correctly. 7
The duty to family members and those in close contact with a
contagious patient appeared again in Davis v. Rodman.5 8 The court
held that a physician owed a duty to correctly instruct and advise
family members and those likely to be brought in contact with the
patient, who are ignorant concerning the character of the disease. 9
In finding this duty within the existing duty of attendance to an
infectious patient, the court stated a physician is "not to negligently
do any act that would tend to spread the infections." 6 Forty nine
years after Davis, a Florida appellate court found in Hofmann v.
Blackmon 61 that a physician has a duty to inform persons in charge
of a minor child, who is a member of the immediate family and
living with a contagious person, of precautionary steps to be taken
to prevent the child from contracting the disease.6 2 The physician's
failure to diagnose the disease did not negate this duty.63 The decision in Hofmann has been frequently cited in later contagious dis53. Id. at 664.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 663-64.
56. Id. at 664.
57. Id.
58. 227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921) (demurrer sustained for lack of specific facts in pleading showing
causation when doctor advised parents to move typhoid infected emancipated sons into family home).
59. Id. at 614.
60. Id.
61. 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
62. Id. at 753. In Hofmann, the defendant physician had treated a man for 2 years without
diagnosing his condition as tuberculosis. The man's 2 year old daughter was then diagnosed with
tuberculosis of the spine after which the man was definitively diagnosed with TB. The court reversed
the lower court's summary judgement and remanded for further proceedings.
63. Id.
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ease cases as a benchmark, although the opinion gives no helpful
reasoning, and simply relies on citation to the aforementioned cases.
The Ohio Supreme Court, without citing any precedent, came
to the same conclusion in 1928 in Jones v. Stanko. 4 The court found
a physician's duty extends to those who, although not members of
the immediate family, rely to their detriment on direct information
from the physician. 6 In Jones, the court held that a physician could
be liable for diagnostic negligence to the estate of a neighbor who
cared for and prepared for burial the patient who ultimately died
of undiagnosed smallpox. 66 The neighbor had relied on the direct
assurance by the physician that the patient did not have a contagious
disease and that the neighbor would be at no risk for illness. 67 The
court did not directly address the question of duty to the caring
neighbor, but by its holding implied that when a physician gives
negligent information directly to a third person, a duty arises sufficient to support a cause of action, even though the relationship
6
is outside the classic physician-patient relationship. 1
More recently, courts have added the special relationship exception as another tool in determining liability outside the physicianpatient relationship. Imposition of duty does not occur simply because one realizes action on his part will be necessary for another's
protection. 69 However, exception to this general rule occurs when a
special relationship exists between the parties. 70 A Michigan appellate
64. 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 456.

67. Id.
68. Compare Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).

Wife's cause of action allowed in negligence against husband's employers who did not inform him
of tubercular condition noted on gratuitous physical examination. The husband continued to live with
his family relying on the company's practice of informing employees of any irregularities noted on
an exam. The court found that it was reasonably foreseeable by the company that the wife would
contract TB. The examining physicians were not parties to the suit because the complaint alleged that
the examinations were made by agents and employees of the company.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
70. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) notes several relationships as special; com-

mon carrier/passengers, innkeeper/guest, land owner/public invitee, one who takes custody of another
who is then deprived of normal opportunities for protection. The Institute, by Caveat and in Comment
b., leaves open as to whether there may be other relationships which impose a similar duty but
recognizes a trend toward recognizing duty in relations of dependence or of mutual dependence.
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court found this duty to exist within the physician-patient relation-

ship when it reversed the trial court's dismissal in Shepard v. Redford Community Hospital.71 Relying on mandatory authority finding
physicians potentially liable in treating patients with seizures,72 the
73
court allowed a mother to bring an action for the death of her son.
The mother had been treated by the defendant physician who pre-

scribed antibiotics for flu when the mother actually suffered from
meningitis. 74 She was instructed to return if she did not improve. 75
76
Shortly after sh returned home, her son died of spinal meningitis.
The court found the physician-patient relationship sufficiently "special," thereby extending the physician's duty to a foreseeable victim
of his conduct, a son who was a member of her household. 77 Although recognizing the physician's concerns about confidentiality
and limitless liability, the facts of the case warranted a 78cause of
action for the mother because of the family relationship.
However, an Illinois court found that a close family relationship
does not always produce a special relationship sufficient to support a
cause of action against a physician. 79 Because of an intimate motherchild relationship, the Illinois Supreme Court had previously extended
a physician's duty to include the protected rights of an injured newborn
when the mother was negligently transfused with incompatible Rh blood"
71. 390 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
72. Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (failure to diagnose or properly
treat an epileptic patient may create a risk of harm to third parties); see also Welke v. Kuzilla, 375
N.W.2d 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (cause of action against physician who injected patient with
unknown substance and allowed patient to drive his [the physician's] car resulting in accident with
plaintiff).
73. Shepard, 390 N.W.2d at 241.
74. Id. at 240.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 241.
78. Id.
79. Britton v. Soltes, 563 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
80. When a Rh negative female is sensitized to Rh positive blood by transfusion or first pregnancy, a gradual immune response is produced by formation of antibodies against the positive Rh
factor in red blood cells. When the sensitized female becomes pregnant with an Rh positive fetus,
her body reacts by forming anti-Rh agglutinins which enter the fetal circulation through the placental
membrane. The results are clumping and destruction of fetal red blood cells producing excess hemoglobin pigments. The effects are not seen while the fetus is in utero because the mother's system
detoxifies the blood. However, after birth, the baby's system is too immature to rid its system of
the excess hemoglobin. Possible results are jaundice, anemia, nerve tissue destruction and generalized
tissue and brain damage. MILLER & KEANE, supra note 1, at 840.
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13 years earlier. Consistently, the same court did not extend physician
liability to an injured auto passenger where the driver-patient took
antipsychotic medication because no such intimate relationship existed.82
However, the Illinois court found another situation less clear cut.
The 1990 decision of Britton v. Soltes 3 continued to limit liability
when the appellate court sustained the lower court's partial summary
judgement against the ex-wife and children of a man with tuberculosis. 84 The contagious father lived next door and visited the children frequently during the time that he was under the defendant's
care but allegedly negligently undiagnosed.85 The court held that a
"duty will be extended only where the relationship between the patient and the third party is such that negligence to the patient necessarily results in injury to the third party.' '86 The court did not
find the relationship between the father and the family sufficiently
special, such as the intimate mother/fetus relationship, because he
was divorced and living separately therefore making the family's
infection happenstance. 7 Additionally, the defendant had never
treated the;,ex-wife and children, so he was unaware of their relationship with his patient.88
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals annunciated this reasoning
more definitively in their interpretation of Colorado law by determining that the doctor has no duty to extend warning about contagious diseases to those unknown to him.89 In Gammill v. United
States, the court upheld the district court's decision adverse to the
plaintiff's Federal Tort Claims Act action.90 A civilian physician employed by the government treated a patient for hepatitis but did not

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Il1. 1977).
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 513 N.E.2d 387 (Ill.
1987).
563 N.E.2d 910 (I1. App. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 912-13.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 911.
Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id.
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notify the local health department of the illness. 9' The plaintiffs
voluntarily cared for the patient's children and contracted the disease
from the then asymptomatic children. 92 The court squarely dispensed
of any duty to warn the plaintiffs due to a special relationship because the doctor and the plaintiffs were not even acquainted. 93 The
court then held "that at the bare minimum the physician must be
aware of the specific risks to specific persons before a duty to warn
exists." 94 (emphasis added)
Some very broad generalizations can be made from existing case
law in predicting extension of physician liability. When a physician
personally gives negligent advice to a third person, family member
or not, concerning the risk of contamination from a patient, liability
will most likely be extended to that contaminated party. This extension of liability is reasonable for it is founded on a "quasi"
physician-patient relationship. The physician knows the exact person
to whom he is giving advice and no intermediary exists that can
cause the advice to be distorted.
Generally, the relationships found within a nuclear family may
be sufficient to support a cause of action for physician negligence
in treatment of communicable disease. However, if the family unit
is not intact and living within the same household, the court may
view the non-patient's infection as a happening of mere chance.
Complexity of modern day relationships requires courts to carefully
respond to the specific factual setting in determining the reasonable
extent of physician liability.
V.

ANALYSIS OF DiMARco v. LYNCH HOMEs-CESTER COUNTY,

INC.
At first glance, the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
of DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc.95 sends shivers
of fear down the spines of physicians and joy to the hearts of plain-

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
583

at 951.
at 951-52.
at 954.
A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990) [hereinafter DiMarco II].
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tiff's lawyers. In actuality, the decision says nothing new - only
that a physician must treat his patient carefully and, from a litigation
view, defensively. The decision appears to extend physician liability
to all third persons infected with a communicable disease through
sexual intimacy with a treated patient. Still, physicians who are aware
of the facts and holding in this case will be better able to make
daily decisions in the treatment of communicable diseases.
The close 4-3 decision may require explanation from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the future. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court has subtly criticized the decision for going too far in announcing such a broad general rule. To understand the meaning and
possible limitations of the decision, analysis will begin with the
appea 9 6 to the Pennsylvania Superior Court from the trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. 97 For simplicity and lack of clearer
designation,. the intermediate appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is designated DiMarco I, while appeal to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania is designated DiMarco HI.
A.

Facts

A female phlebotomist (one who obtains blood specimens for
laboratory testing) sustained a needle stick while drawing blood from
a carrier of hepatitis. 98 She consulted the defendant osteopaths who
advised her she would not have contracted hepatitis if she did not
have symptoms within 6 weeks. 99 The defendants also advised her
to abstain from sexual relations during this 6 week period. 00
Remaining asymptomatic, she resumed sexual relations with the
plaintiff after 8 weeks.' 0' Ultimately, the phlebotomist and plaintiff

96. DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 559 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) [hereinafter DiMarco 11.
97. Id. at 530.

98. Id. at 531.
99. Id.
100. Id. Inconsistency is noted as the Supreme Court in Dimarco II states that no advice was
given concerning sexual abstinence. DiMarco I1, 583 A.2d at 423.
101. DiMarco 1, 559 A.2d at 531.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss4/9

14

Moore: Dimarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc.: How Far Should West

1992]

PHYSICIAN LIABILITY

1045

were diagnosed with Hepatitis B 0 2 in 3 months and 6 months ret4
spectively. 0 3 The phlebotomist had separated from her husband. '
She did not reside with the plaintiff but they had been sexual part-

ners prior to the needlestick.'05 The trial court determined that the
defendants knew both the phlebotomist and the plaintiff personally

intimate.'
and "were aware or had reason to know [they] were
07
complaint.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's

06

B. DiMarco I: Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

The superior court recognized the trial court's reasoning in not
extending a physician's duty into the patient's private sexual conduct

and the public policy concern of supporting family values. 08 However, the court found public policy did not outweigh the injury sus-

tained by the plaintiff under these facts.' t
The court recognized the general rule that, absent a physicianpatient relationship, there can be no malpractice action." 0 Nevertheless, the court found a basis for duty in Section 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,"' if the plaintiff relied on the doc102. Hepatitis B ("serum hepatitis") is a viral infection of the liver with an incubation period
of 6 weeks to 6 months. It is usually transmitted by inoculation of infected blood, however, the
antigen has been found in most body secretions and can be spread by oral or sexual contact. The
clinical features of Hepatitis A ("infectious," or short-incubation period disease) and B are similar,
but Hepatitis A has a 2-6 week incubation. C. Michael Knauer, M.D. & Sol Silverman, Jr., D.D.S.,
Alimentary Tract & Liver, in CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 433-434 (Steven A. Schroeder et al. eds., 1990).
103. DiMarco I, 559 A.2d at 531.
104. Caveat: It is of note that the headnote printed for this case erroneously states that the
plaintiff is the woman's husband. Two authorities have followed this information; 70 C.J.S. Physicians
App. Ct. 1990).
and Surgeons § 87 (Supp. 1991); Heigert v. Riedel, 565 N.E.2d 60, 63 (I11.
105. DiMarco 1, 559 A.2d at 531.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 530.
108. Id. at 531.
109. Id. at 532.
110. Id.
Ill. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) reads:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject
to liability to the third person for the physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or
the third person upon the undertaking.
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tors' advice in consenting to sexual relations. The court also distinguished this case from mandatory precedent" 2 denying a cause of
action because of lack of a direct physician-patient relationship for
two reasons. First, a physician-patient relationship existed between
the phlebotomist and the defendants." 3 Secondly, communicable diseases require prevention and control to protect the public at large." 4
In its analysis, the court looked to the Hofmann and Shepard decisions holding that actions were available for children who had
contracted communicable diseases from their parents." 5
DiMarco I was "limited to the facts of the case before us""' 6
where the plaintiff claimed knowledge and reliance on erroneous
medical advice in interacting with the patient.' 7 For emphasis, the
court quoted the cautioning words of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz,"8 : "We refrain 'from attempting
to fashion broad general rules as a panacea. The obviously wiser
choice is to resolve disputes on a case-by-case basis until we develop,
through experiences in [an] area, a sound basis for developing overall
principles."' 9 By reversing and remanding in favor of the plaintiff,
the court held the "physicians had a duty to act reasonably in advising [the patient] regarding her ability to transmit the communicable disease.' '1 20 Unfortunately, these limitations on the holding
appear in a footnote instead of being prominently placed in the body
of the opinion.
C. DiMarco II: Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
The defendants' appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
resulted in a 4-3 affirmation of the superior court's decision.' 2, The
112. Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assurance Co., 545 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. Ct.1988) (life
insurance company medical director owed no duty to applicant in reading EKG or advising of results),
Craddock v. Gross, 504 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (doctor employed strictly by workmen's

compensation carrier owed no duty to employee for examination of work related injury).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

DiMarco I, 559 A.2d at 533.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535 n.3.
Id. at 535.
421 A.2d 1027, 1036 n.21 (Pa. 1980).
DiMarco I, 559 A.2d at 535 n.3.
Id.
DiMarco I, 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990).
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supreme court explained the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
324A in terms of a requirement of foreseeability. 1 2 The court followed their own reasoning as set forth in Cantwell v. Allegheny
County.12 Cantwell established that to state a cause of action based
on the Restatement of Torts Section 324A, there must be facts to
establish the defendant has undertaken "to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
' 12 4
a third person.
The court reasoned that a physician's advice to the patient concerning proper sanitary procedures during the communicable period
was not for the protection of the patient, whose health has already
been compromised, but to protect the health of others "within the
foreseeable orbit of risk of harm." 1 2 A duty to protect third persons
exists within the Pennsylvania reporting regulations requiring phy1 26
sicians to notify the local board of health of Hepatitis B cases.
Therefore, the court concluded that erroneous advice to a patient
with a communicable disease would allow a cause of action against
the doctor by anyone likely to and who does contract the disease.12 7
In addition to finding a cause of action for the plaintiff, the
court further held "that the class of persons whose health is likely
to be threatened by the patient includes any one who is physically
intimate with the patient. 1 28 Adding an awakening slap on the trial
court's face, the court noted the societal reality of extramarital relationships over the wishful thinking of moralists1 2 9 thereby requiring
protection of all persons in intimate relationships.
Until the decision of DiMarco II, the majority of courts addressing communicable disease cases, providing only a grey line of
122. Id. at 424.
123. 483 A.2d 1350 (Pa. 1984). This case centered on the issue of whether the county crime lab

owed a duty to an incarcerated rape suspect in the performance of laboratory tests for the police
department for investigative purposes. The court found that the suspect failed to state a cause of
action.
124. DiMarco II, 583 A.2d at 424.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 425. The court cites 28 Pa. Code § 27.115 requiring physicians to report cases of
Hepatitis B.
127. Id. at 424-25.
128. Id. at 425.
129. Id.
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predictability for physician liability, has been most sympathetic to
plaintiffs related by blood or marriage. The broad language of the
DiMarco 11 holding appears to open the door for claims against
physicians by any plaintiff who becomes sexually intimate with the
communicable patient, providing there exists sufficient proof of causation. If a patient has multiple sexual partners, the monetary liability could increase exponentially.
However, the court did not address the important question of
whether the injured third party must have actual knowledge of the
specific advice given to the patient. Additionally, the advice the patient relates to the third party may be in a substantially different
form than when originally communicated from the doctor to the
patient. In essence, the majority's broad holding creates more questions than it answers. Courts should view the breadth of the DiMarco
II decision with caution. Hasty adoption of such a broad rule extending physician liability would be unwise in an untested., area of
law.
D. The Dissent
In a hearty dissent, Justice Flaherty argues that the majority
misstates the Pennsylvania rule concerning professional liability under Restatement Section 324A by relying on the non-professional
situation in Cantwell.130 By looking to precedent concerning professional duty to third persons, the minority finds that absent privity
or a specific undertaking for the benefit of the third person, there
exists no duty and therefore no liability."' In addition to opening
up physician liability to situations beyond their control and knowledge, the minority foresees doctors limiting their inquiries into patient's private lives to avoid potential suits, thereby hampering the
patient's treatment. 32
130. Id.
131. Guy v. Leiderbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983) (supreme court specifically retains an
attorney-client relationship or a specific undertaking by the attorney as necessary to maintain a negligence action). See Lawall v. Groman, 37 A. 98 (Pa. 1897) (in dicta, an attorney has duty to exercise
reasonable care to third parties if 1) undertook specific service to third party, 2) third party relied
3) attorney aware of reliance).
132. DiMarco II, 583 A.2d at 426, 427 n.4.
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The dissent presents two arguments. First, the minority argues
that Pennsylvania law requires a professional relationship or a spe-

cific undertaking for the third party to maintain a malpractice action.133 This argument's flaw becomes apparent since the injuries
sustained in precedents were economic and not physical. A strong
argument can be made that the precedents can not be analogous
and, therefore, do not bar actions outside a physician-patient re1

lationship.

34

Secondly, the more valid argument asserts that a physician may
be forced to practice so defensively that the health of the patient,
3 5 The
third persons and the public in general will be compromised.Y
minority might have been willing to agree with the majority if the

holding would have been more factually limited and did not an-

nounce the rule in such general terms.
E. After DiMarco II: Possible Limitations
Courts have decided two cases concerning a physician's duty to
third persons since DiMarco 11, but these cases revolve around distinguishable facts,3 6 lending little aid in predicting the extent of
DiMarco I. But importantly in these opinions, the superior court
makes clear that the intention of their decision in DiMarco I was
limited to those specific circumstances involved: where a physician
gives advice to a contagious patient that a non-patient claims to be
37
aware of and specifically relies on in interaction with the patient.
Because of these complaints from the superior court, it would be
possible that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may clarify its holding

133. Id. at 426.
134. Id. at 425 n.1.
135. See id. at 427 n.4.
136. Crosby v. Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (no cause of action allowed against
physician when diabetic patient lost consciousness while driving resulting in injury to plaintiffs); Dunkle
v. Food Service East, Inc., 582 A.2d 1342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (psychiatrist owes no duty to warn
non-patient of patient's dangerous propensities or to protect non-patient where patient has not threatened harm to a particular individual).
137. Crosby, 592 A.2d at 1343 n.9 ("In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's evaluation and
ultimate decision in DiMarco far extended the narrow holding that this Court explicitly intended when
it decided the case originally."); Dunkle, 582 A.2d at 1348 ("In addition, this Court was clear in its
directive that DiMarco be confined to the circumstances of that case.").
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in DiMarco II,13 when faced with another similar case in the future.
Courts should approach claims of non-patients with caution. Close
attention must be paid to the facts and proof of causation. A prosaic
following of the holding in DiMarco II could require courts to modify the rule in later caes. The better approach allows an evolution
of law arising from a case by case analysis. The DiMarcoII decision
does little to change the physician's everyday treatment of patients
with communicable diseases. Appropriate laboratory tests must be
administered and while awaiting results, conservative advice should
be given concerning the behaviors to avoid for protection of others.
This advice should be clearly documented in the patient's record.
The patient may be given specific written instructions including information about the disease and how it can be transmitted. 39 The
patient can then show these written instructions to those in close
contact with him, ensuring the physician's instructions remain intact
when delivered to non-patients. A copy of the written instructions
should be retained in the patient's record as evidence of the actual
instructions given.
VI.

EFFECTS OF REPORTING STATUTES

Communicable disease reporting statutes have not been particularly helpful to plaintiffs in bringing claims against physicians, nor
has compliance been of great advantage in protecting physicians

against liability. Many state statutes require physicians to report
communicable and infectious diseases to
failure of which is a misdemeanor.' 4' The
produce liability to those contracting the
to report can be shown as the proximate

local health officers, the
failure to report does not
disease unless the failure
cause of the injury. 42

138. Phone interview with Susan M. Weber, R.N., J.D. of the Pennsylvania Medical Society
(Aug. 14, 1991). The Society is closely watching further developments in the wake of DiMarco. There
is the possibility of the Society entering in as amicus to the court should Dunkle or Crosby be appealed.
139. Commercially prepared information sheets are available. The information sheets could then
be personalized to the specific patient by hand written instruction.
140. These recommendations are given by the author from 13 years experience as a R4gistered
Nurse, 7 of which were in a family practice setting. The author credits development of her ,iews to
Dr. LeMoyne Coffield of New Martinsville, WV and the late Dr. Terrell Coffield for their close

attention to quality patient care, patient teaching and careful documentation.
141. 61 AM. Jtn. 2D Physician, Surgeons, Etc. § 245 (1981).
142. Id.
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The individual states possess the power and duty to protect the
citizenry against communicable diseases and have been vested with
4
broad discretion in promulgation of legislation to effect this end. 1
The specific language of the statute and associated regulations by
the state's health department must be read carefully to determine
when the duty to report arises, either when the disease is suspected
or when it becomes definitively diagnosed. By way of example, the
court in Sorgente v. Richmond Memorial Hospital'" read the New
York law on tuberculosis, specifically addressing protection of a
patient's household, 145 to impose a duty on a physician only upon
actual discovery of the tuberculosis. 146 The patient's son contracted
tuberculosis shortly after the doctor diagnosed the father as having
the disease. However, the father had been under the doctor's care
for some time without a definitive diagnosis .147 The court dismissed
the son's claim against the doctor for negligent diagnosis of his
father because duty by statute to protect the household members
did not arise until definitive diagnosis. 48 Apparently no cases have
turned strictly on reporting statutes to state a claim but have used
non-reporting as a theory of duty to enhance physician liability found
49
in case law.
A.

West Virginia Communicable Disease Reporting Statutes

The West Virginia Legislature has placed a duty upon physicians
to report communicable disease to local health officers upon diagnosis by stating:
It shall be the duty of every practicing physician to report to the municipal or
county health officer, where there is such official, immediately on diagnosis, those
diseases or conditions for which a report is required by the state board of health
and in the manner specified by the state health director which may arise or come
under the physician's treatment. Any health officer receiving such reports shall

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
F.2d 950

39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 18 (1976).
539 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
Id.at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id.; See also Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919); Gammill v. United States, 727
(10th Cir. 1984).
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make to the state director of health a weekly report in a manner specified by the
director of health.' 50

However, by the empowerment of the Division of Health' with the
determination of which diseases will be reported 5 2 and subsequent
promulgation of rules and regulations,' the physician's duty arises
"upon suspecting a case of a reportable disease to follow a method
of control as specified by the state health director."' 5 4 The physician

is "to follow a protocol as specified by the state health director for
reporting to the county health department."' 55 Physicians who fail
to report those diseases specified are guilty of a misdemeanor and,

150. W. VA. CODE § 16-2A-5 (1991).
151. See generally W. VA. CODE § 5F-2-1(d)(4) (1990) (redesignation of the Department of Health
as Division of Health, within the Department of Health and Human Resources).
152. Telephone Interview with Loretta Haddy, Director of Surveillance and Disease Control,
West Virginia Department of Health (Aug. 5, 1991) (there are no federal statutes for determination
of what diseases are reportable but recommendations from the Counsel of State and Territorial Epidemiologists are used in deciding which diseases will be reportable in West Virginia); See also 64
W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 5 (1991) (W. Va. Legislative Rules of the Board of Health, Reportable Diseases
sets forth 4 categories of reportable diseases) (Table 64-7A lists specific reporting requirements and
diseases applicable to physicians): 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 5.1 (1991) (Category I Diseases or conditions
to be reported immediately by telephone to the county health department, including case name, address, age and sex. Call within 24 hours to report: botulism, cholera, diphtheria, foodborne diseases,
gonococcal disease, ...

meningitis, ...

plague, poliomyelitis, smallpox, syphilis, ...

waterborne

disease, yellow fever.. .); 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 5.2 (1991) (Category II Diseases or conditions reported
weekly by name, address, age and sex to the county health department: amebiasis, anthrax, brucellosis,
campylobacteriosis, chancroid, chlamydia trachomatis, conjunctivitis in the newborn, other than gonococcal, encephalitis .. ., giardiasis, gonorrhea .. ., hepatitis ... , herpes simplex virus (Type 2),
leptospirosis, lyme disease, malaria, meningitis . . ., mumps, pertussis, psittacosis, rabies in Animals
and in Man, rheumatic fever, rubella. . ., rubedla, salmonellosis. . ., shigellosis, syphilis (late latent),
tetanus, trichinosis, tuberculosis (All Forms), tularemia, typhoid fever, typhus fever ... ); 64 W. VA.
C.S.R. 7 § 5.3 (1991) (Category III Diseases to be reported weekly by numerical totals to the county
health department: chickenpox, influenza-like illness); 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 5.4 (1991) (Category IV
Illnesses of unusual prevalence or clusters of unexplained health occurrences to be reported by name,
age, sex, and specific disease information to the state health department according to protocols specified by the director of the department: Symptomatic infection with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV), including person with AIDS and with other illnesses falling in Groups I, III and IV of
the CDC HIV infection classification, birth defects, cancer, dengue, hemophilia, lead poisoning, occupational-related illnesses, unusual or ill-defined conditions); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-8(b) (1991) ("The
department shall promulgate rules ... to provide for a reporting and monitoring system for reporting
to the department all positive HIV tests results."); W. VA. CODE § 26-5A-4 (1986) (requiring physician
to report to the health department within 48 hours every tuberculosis diagnosis by name, age, sex,
race and address).
153. W. VA. CODE § 16-1-7 (1991).
154. 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 8 (1991).

155. Id. at § 7.
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upon conviction, will be fined no more than two hundred dollars
15 6
or imprisoned for no more than thirty days.

Duty to report does not arise if the patient becomes hospitalized
or placed in a nursing home.15 7 In those cases, the duty to report
rests with the admitting institution.1 58 Additionally, statutes require
private and public laboratories to immediately report certain positive
laboratory tests to either the county health department or to the

State Department of Health. 5 9
Additional reporting statutes for tuberculosis' 6° and venereal
diseases' 6 are scattered throughout the West Virginia Code. Inconsistency becomes apparent when one compares these statutory requirements imposed upon physicians to the rules promulgated by

the Board of Health. 62 Fortunately, the AIDS-Related Medical Testing and Records Confidentiality Act1 61 is placed logically within the
Code in close proximity to the general communicable disease sta-

tutes. The Act provides that the Department of Health shall promulgate rules for reporting to the Department all positive HIV test

results.' 64 The Act permits, within strict confidentiality requirements,
the use of HIV test results to inform individuals who may be at
risk of having acquired the HIV infection from a serologic positive
person. 6 1 Additionally, the legislature has limited physician duty by
stating:
156. Id. at § 24.
157. Id.at § 7.
158. Id.at § 6.
159. Id. at § 6 (public and private laboratories have a duty to report immediately positive results
of tests in Categories I,II and III to the county health department and Category IV to the state
department of health).
160. W. VA. CODE § 26-5A-4 (1986) (Tuberculosis Control statute requires written report of
tuberculosis cases within 48 hours after diagnosis to the department of health); W. VA. CODE § 1625-3 (1991) (diagnosed tuberculosis cases shall be reported within 72 hours, excluding Sundays and
holidays, to the state department of health whose misdemeanor violation will incur a fine of not less
than twenty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars).
161. W. VA. CODE § 16-4-6 (1991) (requiring written reports to both the local municipal or
county health officer and to the director of health of the State within 48 hours).
162. 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 5.2 (1991) (tuberculosis cases to be reported weekly by name, address,
age and sex to the county health department); 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 5.1 (1991) (requiring cases of
gonorrhea and syphilis to be reported immediately to the county health department by telephone
within 24 hours).
163. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-I to -9 (1991).
164. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-8(b) (1991).
165. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(d) (1991).
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There is no duty on the part of the physician or health care provider to notify
the spouse or other sexual partner of, or persons who have shared needles with,
an infected individual of their HIV infection and a cause of action will not arise
from any failure to make such notification. However, if contact is not made, the
department will be so notified.6

Legislative reform is necessary in communicable disease statutes
to provide physicians with consistent, easily accessible and readily

obtainable information concerning their duty to report. This reform
could be obtained by repeal of outdated and misplaced statutes, and
replaced by a general statute defining when a physician's duty to
report arises. Clear centralization of authority, subject to legislative
approval, should be placed with the Department of Health for dealing with communicable diseases.

Until such centralization becomes a reality, the aforementioned
statutes and rules will promote confusion in determining whether a
physician's duty to report arises on suspicion or confirmation of
diagnosis. If the patient presents for treatment in the office setting,
the physician suspecting a case of reportable communicable disease
should consult the information contained in the West Virginia Re-

portableDisease ProtocolManual.167 This manual should be a readily accessible tool for reference in all physicians' offices.

The ProtocolManual also includes examples of some reporting

forms 68 that provide a section to request assistance in contact follow-up. 69 The state provides a contact tracing program to follow
up communicable disease cases for the notification of persons pos-

166. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(e) (1991).
167. STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REPORTABLE DISEASES PROTOCOL MANUAL
(1988) [hereinafter Protocol Manual]. This first edition manual is published by the West Virginia
Department of Health and is available through local health departments. It was developed as a reference guide for dealing with diseases required to be reported by the Board of Health. In addition
to general information such as phone numbers for immediate reporting of certain diseases, each
reportable disease is separately indexed with reporting protocol for medical care providers. The protocol varies with the disease, ranging from required reporting upon suspicion of disease to others
requiring reporting only upon definitive diagnosis by laboratory test.
168. Id. The report forms are only samples for informational purposes. Actual reporting forms
must be requested from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Office of
Epidemiology and Health Promotion, Division of Surveillance and Disease Control, 1422 Washington
Street, East, Charleston, WV 25305 or by calling 1-800-423-1271.
169. Id. (Exhibit 9 re: Syphilis. Form No.VD-15-11/86 West Virginia State Department of Health).
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sibly infected and to limit the spread of disease. 70 The extent of
tracing depends upon the specific disease. For example, the Department of Health will trace hepatitis to the initial contact and
household members, while the Department follows sexually transmitted diseases, such as AIDS or syphilis, until contact information
is exhausted.'17 This policy seems7 2inconsistent in that Hepatitis B
can also be sexually transmitted.
An estimate purports that only 10 0 of communicable disease
73
reports contain a request for state assistance in contact follow-up.
Also, theoretically, a physician who did not choose to participate
in the State's tracing program could then be liable to infected persons. 174 Therefore, routine request for state follow-up in communicable disease cases promotes the best interest of both the nonpatient and the physician. Request for routine State contact followup could effectuate reduction in the spread of disease. Also, by
requesting assistance, the physician shows action on his part not
only to comply with statutory duty but to control disease dissemination.
Additionally, the physician has a statutory duty in reportable
diseases to:
advise other members of the household regarding the precautions to be taken to
prevent further spread of the disease, (using caution where venereal disease is
involved) and shall cooperate with the county health officer in seeing that the
methods of the state director of health concerning the control of such reportable
7diseases are carried out by the patient and other members of the household.'

This legislative rule is explicit in limiting the physician's duty to
advise of the patient's disease only to those who live as part of the
patient's household.
170. Telephone Interview with Loretta E. Haddy, Director of Surveillance and Disease Control
for the West Virginia Department of Public Health (July 18, 1991).
171. Id.
172. "Hepatitis B is a viral infection of the liver usually transmitted by inoculation of infected
blood or blood products. However, the antigen has been found in most body secretions, and it is
known that the disease can be spread by oral or sexual contact." C. Michael Knauer, M.D. & Sol
Silverman, Jr., D.D.S., Alimentary Tract & Liver, in CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT
433 (Steven A. Schroeder et al. eds., 1990).
173. Telephone Interview with Loretta Haddy, supra note 170.
174. Id.

175. 64 W. VA. C.S.R. 7 § 8 (1991).
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However, a person injured by violation of a West Virginia statute
may recover in a civil action, unless the penalty imposed is expressly
mentioned to be in lieu of such damages. 76 Apparently, the reporting
statutes make no mention of such limitations. Additionally, compliance with a statute constitutes competent proof of due care but
will not be conclusive. 177 Therefore, compliance with the reporting
statutes will not insulate the physician from a civil suit, but only
aid in showing that the physician complied with the minimum standards imposed for the protection of non-patients.
VII.

RECENT WEST VIRGINIA MALPRACTICE CASES

Research of West Virginia case law reveals no authority in regard
to the direct transmission of communicable disease nor physician
duty to third persons who have contracted communicable diseases.

However, decisions involving third party plaintiffs show a reluctance
to extend the liability of a professional.

First, the court in FirstNationalBank of Bluefield v. Crawford78
adopted the majority and Restatement 179 view that liability of professional accountants is limited. An accountant, in absence of privity
of contract, becomes liable for negligence only to those who he
knows will receive and rely on his report. 80 This case, of course,
concerns economic losses and is thus difficult to analogize to the
physical injury suffered by a third party contracting a communicable
disease. However, the theory of reasonable knowledge of the injured
person and his reliance on the information may be useful in limiting
the slippery slope effect possible in the wake of the broad general
rule annunciated in DiMarco I1.
Secondly, the requirement of a professional relationship to bring
a medical malpractice claim remains the law in West Virginia, as
pronounced by the supreme court in Weaver v. Union Carbide Cor-

176. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1981).

177. See Miller v. Warren, 390 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1990).
178. 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1985).
180. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d at 313.
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poration.18' In Weaver, the court answered in the negative a certified
question'8 2 of first impression'83 as to whether a non-patient wife
could maintain a malpractice suit against a marriage counselor. While
in treatment, the counselor alid husband-patient engaged in sexual
relations leading to the dissolution of the marriage. 84 Because of
the breach of a trust relationship with the plaintiff, the court distinguished persuasive authority'85 allowing a malpractice claim when
spouses are jointly counseled. 86 Therefore, the court foreclosed the
malpractice action because no professional relationship existed be87
tween the counselor and the uncounseled spouse.
The court reiterated the holding of Weaver as a basis for affirming summary judgment against the plaintiff's malpractice claim
in Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health/Mental Retardation Counsel,
"' The female patient met with the defendant, an on call crisis
Inc. 88
counselor, while her regular counselor vacationed. 89 She resumed
her regular counseling sessions when he returned, but became sexually involved with the on call crisis counselor. 90 Although recognizing from Weaver the potential validity of a malpractice claim
where a counselor engages in sexual intimacy with a patient during
therapy,19' the court found no therapeutic or trust relationship sufficient to sustain such an action. 92 Apparently, the court is prepared
to allow malpractice action only where there is an identifiable professional relationship.

181. 378 S.E.2d 105 (V. Va. 1989). See also Rand v. Miller, 408 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1991) (a
physician who inaccurately evaluates a prospective employee's medical records for the employer, which

results in non-hiring, will not support a malpractice action because of lack of sufficient professional
relationship).
182. Weaver, 378 S.E.2d at 105.

183. Id. at 106.
184. Id. at 109.
185. Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (a marriage counselor may be liable to
a spouse for loss of consortium resulting from sexual intimacy with the other when both husband

and wife are jointly counseled).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Weaver, 378 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 109.
404 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 429.
Id.at 429-30.
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Most recently in Rand v. Miller,193 the court succinctly stated
that "[t]he essence of a medical malpractice action is a physicianpatient relationship," using for support the Weaver and Sisson decisions. 94 The Rand case involved a physician hired by an employer
to evaluate the medical records submitted by the applicant's personal
physician. 95 In reviewing the plaintiff's records, the defendant detected a personality disorder that prevented the plaintiff from being
hired. 96 The defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court erred
in allowing a medical malpractice claim.' 97 The court agreed, finding
the lack of a sufficient professional relationship between the physician and the applicant to support a malpractice action because the
physician's duty ran to the employer, not to the applicant. 98 Additionally, the defendant had not physically examined the plaintiff,
thus making the relationship tenuous at best. 199 A defamation action
for reporting of false information would have been possible but
became barred by the statute of limitations. 200
However, the court's recognition of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court decision of Ervin v. American GuardianLife Assurance Co.
is of interest. 20 ' The Ervin court held that the Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 324A 202 did not apply to a third party claim when
an insurance company physician advised the company concerning
the applicant's test results. The DiMarco I court distinguished Ervin
when applying Section 324A to the DiMarco facts because there
existed a physician-patient relationship between the doctors and the
phlebotomist, and communicable diseases, such as hepatitis B, must
be controlled. 20 3 The DiMarco II court made no mention of Ervin.
Conceivably, West Virginia courts could follow the conservative
lead in DiMarco I or adopt the broad rule of DiMarco II, when
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

408 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id at 658.
Id.

200. Id. at 659.
201. Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assurance Co., 545 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1988).
202. § 324A, supra note 111.
203. DiMarco I, 559 A.2d at 533.
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faced with a similar third party non-patient claim. The preferred
approach would be the moderate path of the DiMarco I court, utilizing close attendance to facts and relationships and limitation of
the decision to specific facts. The advantage to this approach would
be the prevention of necessary judicial backtracking should the rule
in DiMarco II prove too expansive in extending physician liability
disproportionately.
VIII.

CoNcLusIoN

Non-patient's malpractice claims against physicians for infection
with communicable diseases revolve around specific facts, producing
an unsettled area of law. The recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in DiMarcoII appears to open third party malpractice claims
to anyone who becomes sexually intimate with an infectious patient
and claims knowledge and reliance on physician advice.
Courts should approach similar situations with moderation, not
blindly adopting the broad language of DiMarco II. An evolution
of law under varying factual settings will more likely produce fairness for the third party and physician alike. Physicians should provide the communicable patient with thorough teaching, including
written precautionary instructions. Careful documentation and routine Department of Health notification should be the physician's
standard procedure. Expansion of the Department of Health's contact tracing program would enhance control of communicable disease.
Legislative reform is needed in regard to the various communicable disease statutes sprinkled throughout the West Virginia Code.
Legislation providing centralization with and clarification by the Department of Health, along with a clear definition of when a physician's duty to report communicable diseases arises, would provide
consistency and predictability in an unsettled area of law.
Rebecca Coffield Moore
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